Shri Shamsher Kataria v Honda Siel Cars India Ltd. & Ors- Important case law on anti-competitive agreements The Competition Commission of India (ICC) has ruled that Reliance Jio does not have a dominant position in India with a market share of less than 7% in India. In addition, CCI stated that the incentives for customers could not be considered a violation of section 4(2)(a)(ii) and 4(2) of the Competition Act, 2002, through attractive identification systems and therefore dismissed Airtel`s complaint. The Commission considered that the contested agreements were contrary to Section 3 of the Law and stated that the network of such agreements allowed OEMs to become monopolistic players on aftermarkets for their vehicle model, to create barriers to market entry and to eliminate competition from independent service providers. Section 3 of the Act prohibits anti-competitive agreements that may have a significant impact on competition (“AAEC”). Even if the law does not explicitly mention the terms `horizontal` and `vertical` agreements, it prohibits them, respectively, from the provisions of Article 3(3) and Article 3(4) of the Law. The bill aims to decipher the existing gap in Section 3(4) by broadening its horizon to “other agreements” between companies or individuals operating in different markets at different levels of the production chain. In this context, the ICC`s decision in Ramakant Kini v.H. Hiranandani Hospital (“Ramakant Case”) becomes decisive for the analysis. The ICC has examined in a relevant manner the vertical agreement between Apple and Airtel/Vodafone in Sonam Sharma v Apple Inc., in which the Commission examined the existing agreement as a connecting agreement in accordance with Section 3(4).

In the present case, the character of the agreement was similar to ramakant, but the Commission distracted from its view in the latter and imposed Section 3(1) independently. This derogation by the Commission raises serious doubts about the ICC`s position on anti-competitive agreements. These cases thus draw attention to the ambiguity of the ICC`s perspective and call for a better solution to remedy it. In addition, the bill will expand the Commission`s investigative powers to assess a wide range of anti-competitive agreements that AAEC may have. Therefore, the authors consider that the amendment of Section 3, paragraph 4, is a desirable step to eliminate uncertainty in the current area of anti-competitive agreements. Facts – The informant in this case had alleged anti-competitive practices on the part of counterparties (POs) according to which the original spare parts of the automobiles manufactured by some of the POs were not freely available on the open market and that most equipment manufacturers (equipment manufacturers) and authorized dealers had clauses in their agreements obliging dealers authorized to source spare parts only from equipment manufacturers and their authorized suppliers. . .

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